



American Council for



**The United Nations
University**

The Millennium Project

MAPEO DE FUENTES. Versión 1.0

**BIBLIOGRAFIA
INSTITUCIONES
DOCUMENTACION**

CORRUPCIÓN

**Lic. Miguel Angel GUTIERREZ
Co-Director del CeLGyP**

CeLGyP



**Centro Latinoamericano de Globalización y Prospectiva
Nodo Sudamericano del Millennium Project AC-UNU**

**Buenos Aires, Octubre de 1999
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Reconocimiento: A la Licenciada Elfreedes Salas Navas, por sus fundamentados comentarios y aportes a la mejor presentación del presente trabajo.

Buenos Aires, noviembre de 1999

Lic. Miguel Angel Gutierrez
Co-Director CeLGyP

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

El objetivo del presente trabajo fue inicialmente el colaborar con un proyecto de investigación previamente formulado por la Secretaría de Investigación y Doctorado de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires sobre Seguridad Ciudadana, Delito Organizado y Corrupción, aportando bibliografía y documentación a través de una búsqueda de información en Internet. Frente a la gran cantidad de información recolectada la aplicación se concentro en una primera etapa en este último problema, y se encuentran en preparación trabajos similares para los restantes.

El resultado tomó la forma de un *utilitario para la investigación en Internet*, y dada la potencial utilidad que el método desarrollado puede ofrecer para trabajos de otro tipo este artículo está dirigido a investigadores y auxiliares de investigación y docencia que usan el recurso de la web para actividad. Si el lector no se encuentra familiarizado con la búsqueda de información en redes puede saltar esta introducción e ir directamente a los resultados para el tema corrupción a partir del punto 2.

Después de más de cien horas de investigación en Internet y frente a la necesidad de seleccionar los datos capturados y organizarlos, jerarquizándolos de alguna manera para presentarlos en forma coherente y de modo de facilitar su utilización es que me surgió la idea de la construcción de este *utilitario de investigación* aplicando algunos de los criterios esbozados en la metodología inicialmente desarrollada por el Proyecto Millennium del American Council for the United Nations University, la que fuera utilizada en la elaboración del informe anual "*Estado del Futuro 1997*", denominada "*scanning*" y también "*environmental scanning*", en *Frontiers of Future Studies: A Handbook of Tools and Methods*, UNDP 1997. En dicho proyecto el uso de este recurso se combinó con la aplicación del método Delphi, impactos cruzados y entrevistas a decisores.

Autores mexicanos han acuñado el término "*mapeo contextual*" para esta metodología, el que nos pareció a Eduardo Balbi y a mí más apropiado desde el punto de vista metodológico, que una traducción literal de su original en inglés la que parecería sugerir una investigación vinculada con el ambiente.

Otras ideas que me sirvieron de apoyo en el diseño y desarrollo de este trabajo fue el concepto de *mapa de ruta de la ciencia y la técnica*.¹ De todos modos es preciso señalar que este resultado es substancialmente diferente de ambos métodos, pero ello es porque sirve a diferentes objetivos.

La necesidad de su inmediata utilización ha postergado el desarrollo de aspectos apenas esbozados aquí pero que considero de gran importancia para validar la utilización de esta herramienta como es la cuestión referida a la acreditación de fuentes, donde sólo sugiero una matriz que, soy consciente, es de difícil concreción en forma total y que está pendiente de una más amplia y seria discusión, y la eventual utilización de motores o robots de búsqueda para hacer la recuperación de datos de manera automática.

Antes de describir el método desarrollado haré algunas consideraciones con respecto a Internet. "Actualmente, cualquier persona interesada en computadoras y comunicaciones ha oído hablar y probablemente haya utilizado Internet y la World Wide Web. Comenzando con un sistema que conectaba computadoras entre Universidades y contratistas del área de Defensa (red ARPA), Internet ha surgido como un fenómeno de nuestros tiempos, disponible para investigar o navegar, conversación digital, consulta formal o búsquedas triviales. Inicialmente, Internet proveía información sólo en forma de texto. La World Wide Web (WWW) introdujo diseños gráficos de color, amigables, que han contribuido ampliamente a su popularidad y uso creciente. Aunque la mayoría de los usuarios en línea están concentrados en los EE.UU., la WWW es accesible prácticamente en todo el mundo y su uso en todas partes está creciendo en forma acelerada. Las páginas de la Web están predominantemente escritas en inglés, pero también está cambiando y la WWW se está convirtiendo cada vez más en multilingual. Muchos de los motores de búsqueda en la WWW ofrecen opciones de búsqueda en distintos idiomas.

"La cantidad de información disponible en la WWW es aparentemente infinita y constantemente cambiante. Identificar artículos de interés específico, en este caudal de información, no es siempre sencillo. El problema es determinar qué estrategias de búsqueda, aparentemente razonables, pueden producir volúmenes de "ruido" sepultando los pocos artículos e informes que estén en la mira. Otro problema, es que no se pronosticaba tal demanda, y además el uso extensivo sin costo, requiriendo una nueva gran capacidad y con los

costos ahora fijados por corporaciones y gobiernos. Los costos de acceso pueden comenzar a incrementarse juntamente con la publicidad"².

La maravillosa anarquía de Web ofrece hoy a la investigación datos y documentos de innegable valor, junto a otros de dudosa utilidad, desde corpus documentales a bases de datos referenciales, pasando por una extensa variedad de formas mixtas de contenidos substantivos y referencias útiles. Cómo el diseño de las páginas Web muchas veces paga el tributo al atractivo visual en detrimento de la información incorporada, o esta queda sepultada por una larga cadena de hipervínculos incorporados con el criterio de especialista en computación antes que con el de documentalista, he puesto énfasis en el punto de vista del usuario, investigador, estudiante, funcionarios que usa Internet como su apoyo documental básico o inicial.

Es cierto también que la tecnología actualmente disponible podría dar al sistema de información acceso a prácticamente toda la producción escrita, lo que es válido en tanto se refiera a la producción de occidente. Tomo nota de que los excluidos - por múltiples razones- de esta forma de comunicación científica son muchos más que los de ella participan, pero no dudamos de su extraordinario potencial para todos.

Por causa de esta explosión de conocimiento el sentido de acceder y comprender una masa inconmensurable de datos ha devenido en una empresa central para la investigación científica. (Goonatilaque, 1998)³, procurare en consecuencia, dar una visión básica de la red y de nuestra metodología de acceso a la información científica en ella.

Información Básica en los Principales Buscadores

En *El Estado del Futuro 1997* se decía: "Hay una docena o más de buscadores para el usuario promedio (hoy se han multiplicado). Cada uno se focaliza en un conjunto de diferentes Bases de Datos y confronta, de diferentes maneras, las palabras claves provistas por el usuario. Sin tener en cuenta la estrategia de búsqueda, los resultados de una búsqueda sencilla pueden ser abrumadores; una búsqueda sobre cuestiones globales, por ejemplo, encontró unos tres millones de correspondencias. Evidentemente nadie comenzaría a seleccionar manualmente, en una pila tan grande para encontrar las pocas pepitas de oro que pudiera contener." (Glenn y Gordon 1997.)

Se consigna seguidamente una lista de los motores de búsqueda más comunes y útiles con sus respectivas direcciones, todas las direcciones en la Web han sido insertadas como hipervínculos de manera que con sólo clicar con el botón izquierdo de su ratón en el texto señalado con URL en azul podrá abrir el motor indicado iniciando una búsqueda de cualquier tipo, contando con un procesador Word 97:⁴

Alta Vista: <http://altavista.digital.com>

CUI: <http://cuiwww.unige.ch/meta-indec.html>

CyberHound: <http://www.cyberhound.com>

Excite: <http://www.excite.com>

EZ Connet: <http://www.ezconnet.com>

Infoseek: <http://www2.infoseek.com>

Lycos: <http://www.lycos.com>

Medexplorer: <http://www.medexplorer.com>

Medsearch: <http://www.medsearch.com>

Open Text: <http://www.opentext.com/omw/f-omw.html>

Ultraseek: <http://www.ultraseek.com>

Webcrawler: <http://www.webcrawler.com>

Yahoo: <http://www.yahoo.com>

Las siguientes direcciones lo llevarán a sitios de referencia de bibliotecas que ofrecen comparaciones útiles, de buscadores individuales:

<http://www.cnet.com/Content/Reviews/Compare/Search/ss3a.html>

<http://www.indiana.edu/?libros/search>

<http://www.state.is.us/educate/depteduc/offtech/search.html>

META BUSCADORES

Muchos “Meta buscadores” han surgido recientemente. Los Meta buscadores son capaces de examinar en múltiples buscadores individuales de Bases de Datos con el lanzamiento de una sola “meta” de investigación. Los Meta buscadores se están haciendo cada

vez más populares, en la medida que pueden evitarle a los usuarios tener que saltar entre múltiples buscadores. La siguiente es una lista de cuatro Meta buscadores disponibles actualmente en la World Wide Web.

IBM InfoMarket: <http://www.infomkt.ibm.com/>

MetaCrawler: <http://MetaCrawler.cs.washington.edu:8080/index.html>

Profusion: <http://www.designlab.ukans.edu/ProFusion.html>

SavvySearch: <http://cage.cs.colostate.edu:1969/>

Agentes de Red

Avanzado un poco más en el uso de programas especializados, un tercer nivel de buscadores ha sido recientemente incorporado a la galaxia de buscadores - un software denominado *net agent*, agente de red personal. Los agentes de red son una clase de software que esencialmente son Meta buscadores de sitios que corren en la computadora personal del usuario y son mucho más acomodables aún, que el mejor de los buscadores o Meta buscadores en línea. Después de correr una búsqueda, el software agente creará básicamente un detallado sumario de todas las páginas encontradas, o transferirá a la computadora las páginas actuales con todas las imágenes en línea y el lenguaje Java para su posterior revisión. El software agente puede ser programado para que automáticamente se actualice a intervalos semanales o diarios. Todo esto puede ser ejecutado sin la intervención del usuario, por ejemplo de noche, para maximizar tiempo y recursos.

A los pioneros NetAttache y WebCompass, se le suman actualmente un gran número de software agente. Unas excelentes reseñas de éstos y otros programas de agentes básicos pueden encontrarse en: <http://www.stroud.com/sagents.html>. De ellos destacamos los siguientes

Copernic2000: /<http://www.copernic.com/copernic2000.exe>

InterQuick: /<ftp://ftp1.deerfield.com/pub/interquick/iqsetup.exe>

NetAttaché: /<http://www.tympani.com/ftp/download/NetAttache/na32v25e.exe>

AnawaveWebSnake: /<http://www.virtualpromote.com/download/WebSnakeInstall30.exe>

Teleport Pro /<http://www.tenmax.com/pro12.exe>

Alexa: /<http://www.alexa.com/alexa30/install/index.html>

NetSonic Internet Accelerator: /<http://www.web3000.com/netsonic/dnl/netsonic.exe>

WebFerret: /<http://208.234.1.71/Downloads/webferret.exe>

[WebWhacker 2000: /http://download.bluesquirrel.com/download/ww2k.exe](http://download.bluesquirrel.com/download/ww2k.exe)

[WebCompass: /ftp://ftp.qdeck.com/demo/demo/wc200_tr.exe](ftp://ftp.qdeck.com/demo/demo/wc200_tr.exe)

[SmartBookmarks:/ftp://papa.indstate.edu/winsock-l/Windows95/WWW-Browsers/Web_Utils/sb3230r.exe](ftp://papa.indstate.edu/winsock-l/Windows95/WWW-Browsers/Web_Utils/sb3230r.exe)

[Oil Change: /ftp://ftp.cybermedia.com/oilchange/ocsetup.exe](ftp://ftp.cybermedia.com/oilchange/ocsetup.exe)

[WebAgent and SuperBookMarks: /ftp://ftp.webcom.com/pub1/igs/win/wagent.exe](ftp://ftp.webcom.com/pub1/igs/win/wagent.exe)

[Surfbot:](#)

[/ftp://papa.indstate.edu/winsock-l/Windows95/WWW-Browsers/Web_Utils/sb301.exe](ftp://papa.indstate.edu/winsock-l/Windows95/WWW-Browsers/Web_Utils/sb301.exe)

También dentro de esta categoría, aunque más especializados y de alcance limitado, están los agentes de noticias. Estos transfieren alimentadores de noticias específicos sobre una base común a su computadora, basados en una pormenorizada selección de algoritmos, los que localizan buscadores y agencias de noticias. Si bien ellos no explorarán la Web per se; proveerán hechos de actualidad altamente personalizados en cientos de campos y actividades específicos. Un ejemplo es: **PointCast:** (<http://www.pointcast.com>) "⁵

Hasta acá la descripción general de la Web, es conveniente volver a la descripción de la metodología desarrollada

El Método Desarrollado

El primer criterio de clasificación que me surgió fue el de ordenar las referencias bibliográficas, luego pense que podría hacerse otro tanto con las instituciones de investigación básicamente orientadas al tema abordado, con posterioridad advertí que una importante porción de la información colectada eran directamente papers o libros, con lo que pensé en la formación de una biblioteca documental.

Otro aspecto importante fue advertir que buena parte de la producción referida a nuestra temática era el resultado de Congresos, Seminarios o reuniones académicas, por lo que estime que valdría también organizar la información referida a los eventos por separado. Por último se decidió incorporar un archivo dedicado a los expertos y especialistas detectados en la búsqueda, con los datos que pudieran facilitar su contacto posterior.

Una vez comenzado el trabajo de organización de la información bajo estos criterios, comprobé que mejor que la simple ordenación alfabética de la bibliografía convendría presentarla en conjuntos más acotados y también surgió la posibilidad de construir una matriz para dar lugar al título de la obra, su ubicación en la red, y alguna información complementaria para dar una idea preliminar sobre el texto en caso de existir.

Decidida la construcción de una matriz para presentar la información preferí que la dirección en la Web se indicara con relación de hipervínculo, con lo que se permitiría acceder directamente al texto referido con sólo clicar en la misma en tanto se trabaje en una PC con acceso a Internet, lo que facilitaría la consulta inmediata.

Similar criterio seguí con respecto a las instituciones, e igualmente usé matrices para presentar la información referida a eventos y expertos.

La parte final de este utilitario debería estar destinada a la formulación de pautas para la acreditación de la información, no ha podido completarse por falta de tiempo, en su lugar se fijan algunos criterios que puedan ser de utilidad para dicha valoración.

Ante la gran cantidad de información disponible, que no permitiría la evaluación individual de cada documento, la idea básica es valorar las fuentes que proveen la información, cuya cantidad es más acotada.

La propuesta sería la construcción de una nueva matriz que pueda asignar valores a criterios como ser: a) Antigüedad de la institución o centro; b) Cantidad de investigadores; c) Presupuesto asignado a los programas de investigación; d) Si la producción de información es continua, periódica o intermitente; e) Vinculaciones con otras instituciones, y f) Usos observados de la información.

Si estos criterios fueran aceptados, los agrupamientos que pudieran ser determinados para cada una de las categorías, como el valor relativo de cada una de ellas debería ser el resultado de un amplio debate entre los científicos usuarios de la información de manera de alcanzar la mayor objetividad posible.

La expectativa es que el uso de este utilitario permita su propio perfeccionamiento, por lo que se pensó usar el mismo criterio de nominación aplicados a los programas de computación denominando a la presente **versión 1.0**, para dar lugar a actualizaciones que puedan denominarse **versiones 1.1 ; 1,2 y sucesivamente**; en tanto aquellos cambios substantivos en el formato y la utilidad del utilitario (como la incorporación de nuevas matrices o la reformulación de las mismas) se denominará **versión 2.0** y así sucesivamente. A este fin se agradecerá todo comentario o crítica al autor a [<mag@global-latino.com>](mailto:mag@global-latino.com)

¹ Miguel A. Gutierrez, "Mapas de Ruta de la Ciencia y la Técnica" En Redes, revista de Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia. Volumen 6 No. 13, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Mayo de 1999,

² Jerome C. Glenn y Theodore Gordon (edit.) "1997 State of the Future" American Council for the United Nations University, The Millennium Project , Washington DC, 1997.

³ Susantha Goodnatilake, "Toward a Global Science, Mining Civilizational Knowledge", Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1998.

⁴ Indicación válida para quienes están consultando la versión en disquete del presente trabajo.

⁵ Glenn y Gordon op.cit.

2. INSTITUCIONES

Instituciones	Dirección	Observaciones
<u>Asian Development Bank Policy on Corruption</u>	<u>http://www.adb.org/Work/Policies/anticorruption</u>	
<u>Central Bureau of Investigation, Government of India</u>	<u>http://cbi.nic.in/</u>	Central Bureau of Investigation is the national investigation agency of Government of India involved in investigation and collection of criminal intelligence in the areas of corruption economic crimes and special crimes.
<u>(Council of Europe) Criminal Law Convention on Corruption</u>	<u>http://www.coe.fr/cm/dec/1998/646/x4.htm</u>	
<u>Coalition 2000</u>	<u>http://www.online.bg/coalition2000/eng/monitor.htm</u>	Coalition 2000 Corruption Monitoring System (CMS). Sofia, July 1998 <i>Coalition 2000 Corruption Indices</i> The corruption indices are constructed based on survey data of Vitosha Research with the Center for the Study of Democracy and are among the basic output results of the Corruption Monitoring System
<u>Department of Commerce Report to Congress on OECD Anti-Bribery Convention</u>	<u>http://www.mac.doc.gov/TCC/BRIBERY/oecd-report/index.html</u>	
<u>HLS Clinical Externship Placement: Mass. AG - Criminal Bureau</u>	<u>http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/Clinical_Program/externship/mass_ag_crim.html</u>	
<u>IMF Guidance Notes on Corruption</u>	<u>http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/1997/nb9715.htm</u>	
<u>FBI, CIA and other government agents document drug trafficking into th...</u>	<u>http://www.ciadrugs.com/</u>	Government agents document widespread government corruption in the CIA, Justice Department, federal courts, and Congress.
<u>Friends Against Corruption and Tyranny Society</u>	21 Oceanview Drive Halifax NS Postal code B3P 2H4 Phone number 477-5100	

RespondaNet: America's Accountability Anti-Corruption Project	http://www.respondanet.com/english/index.htm	
<u>Statutory</u>	http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/statute.htm	<p>Statutory Responsibilities Special Agents of the Criminal Investigation Division and Drug Investigation Division of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation have the authority to investigate any violation of the Tennessee Criminal Code on the request of the District Attorney General in the Judicial District where the offense occurred.</p>
<u>Tennessee Bureau of Investigation</u>	http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/	<p>Is an independent agency of state government accountable to the District Attorneys General and to the Judiciary for its performance of services and to the Executive and Legislative branches for support functions.</p>
<p>The Anti-Corruption Network</p> <p>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development through its Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members</p>	http://www.oecd.org.daf/pd/acnetwork/htm	<p>Is a forum interested in reducing public sector corruption , can exchange information about anti-corruption programmes as well as collaborate on regional, national, and sub-national initiatives. The Network is focused primarily on Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. The coordinating body for the Network is a Steering Group composed of several international organizations and major NGOs.</p>

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau	http://www.gov.sg/pmo/cpiib/	(CPIB) is an independent body which investigates and aims to prevent corruption in the public and private sectors in Singapore.
Transparency International	http://www.transparency-usa.org/.html	Transparency International - USA Recommended Web Links TI Publications: International Conventions: UN Resolutions: International Financial Institutions:
TI Latin America and Caribbean (TI-LAC) Web Site	http://www.transparency-lac.org/	
Transparency International Estados Unidos	TI-USA 1615 L St. N W, Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: 202-682-7048 Fax: 202-682-7086	
<u>(OAS) Inter-American Convention Against Corruption</u>	http://www.oas.org/En/prjog/juridico/english/Sigs/b058.html	
<u>Office of Government Ethics</u>	http://www.usoge.gov/usoge001.html	
<u>UN General Assembly Resolution on Action Against Corruption</u>	gopher:gopher.un.org./00/ga/recs/51/RES51-59.EN	
<u>World Bank Guidelines - Procurement</u>	http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/guidelin.html	
<u>OECD Anti-Corruption Unit Home Page</u>	http://oecd.org/daf/nocorruption	

3. BIBLIOGRAFIA

3.1. BIBLIOTECA ON LINE

3.1.1. Documentos Banco Mundial

3.1.2. Publicaciones de Transparency International

3.1.3 Otros recursos

DOCUMENTO	AUTOR/INSTITUCION	DIRECCION
3.1.1. Documentos Banco Mundial		
Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank	World Bank September 1997	http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/corruptpn/coridx.htm
Reducing Corruption	<i>World Bank Policy and Research Bulletin</i> , July-September 1997	http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Bulletins/prb8.3.html
High-Level Rent-Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes: Theory and Cases High-Level Rent-Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes: Theory and Cases	Jacqueline Coolidge and Susan Rose-Ackerman, June 1997	http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/workpapers/wps1780-abstrac.html
Bank Takes Anti-Corruption Stance	<i>World Bank News</i> , October 11, 1996	http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extcs/news.html
The Political Economy of Corruption—Causes and Consequences	<i>World Bank News</i> , October 11, 1996	http://www.worldbank.org/html/fdp/notes/74/74summary.html
Corruption and Good Governance	1997 Annual Meetings Issue Brief	http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/am97/br/corr.html
Corruption: A Major Barrier to Sound and Equitable Development	October 7, 1996	http://www.worldbank.org/html/backgrd/ibrd/corrupt.html
World Bank President Urges Business, Governments to Take Bolder Steps Against Corruption	October 26, 1997	http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/1515.html
Corruption and Good Governance	1997 Annual Meetings Issue Brief	http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/am97/br-corr.htm

<u>Corruption: A Major Barrier to Sound and Equitable Development</u>	October 7, 1996	http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/corrupt.htm
3.1.2. Publicaciones de Transparency International		
SIGMA/Transparency International Anti-Corruption Directory	The <u>SIGMA/Transparency International Anti-Corruption Directory</u>	Is an in-depth reference guide to multinational programmes supporting anti-corruption efforts in central and eastern European countries (CEECs). The directory covers 13 CEECs participation in SIGMA's work, and programmes operated or sponsored with these countries by multinational organisations
<u>TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).</u>	Http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html	It is considered to be the most reliable and up-to-date information on how corruption levels in particular countries are perceived by business circles
Transparency International Annual Report		The 1998 TI Annual Report is available in <u>print</u> ; portions of it are also available on our WWW Site. You can look at the <u>Table of Contents</u> and follow the links to those sections that are on-line.
<u>TI Newsletters</u>		Our Current Newsletter: <u>June 1999</u> Introduced with the Editorial <u>Civil Society to take centre stage</u> by Peter Eigen. This quarter's Third Page leader is a report on <u>Corruption in the Arms Trade</u> , edited by Ravinder Pal Singh.
<u>TI Source Book</u>	Http://www.transparency.de/documents/source-book/index.html	
<u>TI Study on Conflict of Interest: Legislators, Ministers and Public Officials</u>	Http://www.transparency.de/documents/work-papers/carney/index.html	
<u>TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).</u>	Http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html	It is considered to be the most reliable and up-to-date information on how corruption levels in particular countries are perceived by business circles
<u>TI Study on Access to Information in Developing Countries</u>	Http://www.transparency.de/documents/work-papers/martin-feldman/index.html	

3.1.3. Otros Recursos		
INSIDE ISRAEL	Contact Barry Chamish For editorial correspondence: POB 369 Beit Shemesh Israel 99000 tel. & fax: 972-2-9919436 For subscription free sample copy and information contact: INSIDE ISRAEL POB 579 Swindon, Wiltshire England SN4 OTL fax: 044-1-793-790-772 e-mail: merkava@tcp.co.uk	Is Israel's only investigative news source. Specializing in exposing secretive diplomacy and government corruption, INSIDE ISRAEL is now available through the Internet.
<u>Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service (1998)</u>	OECD	Adopted by the OECD Council on 23 April 1998.
<u>Managing Government Ethics, PUMA Policy Brief No.2 (1997)</u>		Analyses contemporary ethical tensions and describes the factors influencing ethical conduct in the public service.
<u>Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues and Practice (1996)</u>		Examines how nine OECD countries manage ethics and conduct in the public service, with analysis of current tensions and highlights new ethics initiatives
<u>Anti-Corruption Measures in the Public Sector</u>		Article from Focus On-line:
: <u>Ethics in Government Gains Higher Profile</u> and <u>Cracking Corruption.</u>	SIGMA - Public Management Forum, Vol. II, No. 5, 1996	
<u>Ethics Management Calls for Balanced Approach</u>	SIGMA - Public Management Forum, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1998:	
<u>Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service, PUMA Policy Brief No.4 (1998)</u> <input type="checkbox"/>		provides a practical instrument to review ethics management systems.
Democratisation, Corruption and Economic Development: The Case of Thailand	http://www.phuket.loxinfo.co.th/~tpmas/uppsats.html	Tomas Larsson BA thesis
Corruption in China	http://www.home4.swipnet.se/~w-48538/tableofcontents.html	Peter Nimerius MA-thesis
The Big Sky Patriot)	http://imt.net/~mtpatriot/	A newsletter reporting government corruption in the USA (from the White House to the Court House

Electronic Publication	http://www.vheadline.com.ve/	from Venezuela. Containing material about corruption in Latin America.
The Queensland Independent	http://www.uq.edu.au/jrn/tqi	A monthly newspaper by the Department of Journalism, University of Queensland, containing excellent reports about corruptio
Criminal Justice International.	http://www.acsp.uic.edu/oicj/pubs.htm	Excellent online Newspaper.
SURVEY RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	http://unibas.ch/wwz/wifor/survey	A Project for the World Bank (Conducted by Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder). Containing data on corruption
Corruption in Post-Communist Societies	http://www.people.colgate.edu/mjohnston/default.htm	A working bibliography of library and web resources.
Revista Probidad	http://ngwlfirw.com/on/probidad	The e- Journal informs about Corruption and political Control in El Salvador. (in Spanish)
Revista internacional de ciencias sociales.	http://www.unesco.org/issj/rics149/titlepage149.htm	

3. 1. 4. Convenciones Internacionales

3. 1. 5. Resoluciones Naciones Unidas

3. 1. 6. Instituciones Financieras Internacionales

3.1.4. Convenciones Internacionales		
http://www.coe.fr/cm/dec/1998/646/x4.htm	http://www.coe.fr/cm/dec/1998/646/x4.htm	
http://www.oas.org/En/prog/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html	http://www.oas.org/En/prog/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html	
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/20nov1e.htm	http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/20nov1e.htm	
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm	http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm	
3.1.5. Resoluciones UN.		
Gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/recs/51/RES51-59.EN	Gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/recs/51/RES51-59.EN	

UN General Assembly Resolution: UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions	Gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/recs/51/RES51-EN.191	
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3.1.6. Instituciones Financieras Internacionales		
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Code of Good Practices of Fiscal Transparency	http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/PR9814.HTM	
IMF Guidance Notes on Corruption	http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm	
IMF Letters of Intent and other IMF corruption-related statements	http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/mempup.HTM	
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus' Speech at TI-France	http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/012198.htm	

3.1.7. Obtención Gubernamental

3.1. 7. Obtención Gubernamental		
African Development Bank Rules of Procurement of Goods and Services	http://www.afdb.org/opportunities/proc-rules/pr2.html	
Asian Development Bank Procurement Amendments	http://www.adb.org/Business/Procuremet	
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - Procurement Policies and Rules	http://www.ebrd.com/english/procure/index.htm	
Inter-American Development Bank - Procurement of Goods and Services	http://www.iadb.org/exr/english/POLICIES/policies-gen-policies..html	
Recommendations of the IV Business Forum of the Americas on Government Procurement (Workshop VI), San Jose, Costa Rica 1998	http://www.alca.co.cr/ponencias.html	
World Bank Guidelines - Procurement	http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/guidelin.html	

3.1.8. Publicaciones del Gobierno de los EE.UU.

3.1.8. Publicaciones del Gobierno de los EE.UU.

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Department Of Commerce Report To Congress On OECD Anti-Bribery Convention	http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/BRIBERY/oecd-report/index.html	
Department Of Commerce, Anti-Corruption Review	http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/master.html	
Vice President Gore Anti-Corruption Conference	http://www.usia/topical/econ/integrity	
Office Of Government Ethics	http://www.usoge.gov/usoge001.html	
U.S. Information Agency, Economic Perspectives: An Electronic Journal	http://www.usia.gov/journals/issues/1198/ijee/ijee1198.htm	
Text: Gore Closing Remarks To Corruption Conference	http://www.usia/topical/econ/bribes/bribe15.htm	
Text: Deputy Attorney General Holder On Corruption (Discusses Legal Frameworks And Enforcement Authorities)	http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/birbe16.htm	February 25, 1999
Text: Fbi Assistant Director Defeo On Corruption (Outlines Role Of Public Security, Investigative Forces)	http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/birbe18.htm	February 25, 1999
Text: Commerce Department General Counsel On Future Anti-Corruption Steps (Andrew Pincus Targets Political Parties, Party Officials, And Candidates)	http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/birbe22.htm	February 25, 1999
Text: Eizenstat, Aaron On Oecd Convention On Anti-Bribery (15 Of 33 Signatories Of The Convention Have Ratified It)	http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bibrpt2..htm	June 30, 1999
Text: Commerce's Mulloy On Corruption In Osce Region (Outlines Anti-Corruption Campaign)	http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/mull.htm	July 21, 1999

<u>Text: Rubin Urges Cutting Assistance To Corrupt Governments (Corruption Most Damaging To Developing Countries, He Says)</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bribrpt10..htm</u>	February 24, 1999
<u>TEXT: Under Secretary Loy On Corruption (Outlines role of non-governmental organizations)</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bribe17.htm</u>	February 25, 1999
<u>Text: Attorney General Reno On Dangers Of Corruption (Cites Need For Increased Global Cooperation)</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bribrpt19..htm</u>	February 24, 1999
<u>Text: Kaplan On Fight Against Corruption (Calls For Protection For "Whistleblowers")</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bribe14..htm</u>	February 24, 1999
<u>Text: Daley Vows To Expand Fight Against Corruption (Targets Political Parties And Offshore Banking)</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/da10119..htm</u>	February 24, 1999
<u>The Oecd Anti-Corruption Treaty: Why Is It Needed, How Will It Work? (An Interview With Eleanor Roberts Lewis, Chief Counsel For International Commerce, U.S. Department Of Commerce)</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bribe6..htm</u>	November 25, 1998
<u>Text: Albright Sees Progress In Anti-Corruption Effort (Independent Judiciary, Free Press Vital)</u>	<u>http://www.usia/topical/ecom/bribes/bribrpt12..htm</u>	February 24, 1999

3.1.9. Legislación de los EE.UU.

3.1.9 Legislación de los EE.UU.		
<u>Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</u>	<u>http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/cpanew.html</u>	
<u>OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, U.S. Implementing Legislation</u>	<u>http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/leg.html</u>	

3.2. BIBLIOGRAFIA OF LINE

AUTOR	TITLE	DATOS DE EDICION
Gaetner, Gilles	l'Argent facile: dictionnaire de la corruption en France.	1991 Paris: Stock.
Klitgaard, Robert	Controlling Corruption	1988, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press
Klitgaard, Robert	Institutional Adjustment and Adjusting to Institutions. Discussion	1995, Paper No. 303. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (September)
Many Authors	Diccionario de la corrupción en Venezuela,	(1989) Caracas: Ediciones Capriles. 2vols.
Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, and H Lindsey Parris	Corrupt Cities	forthcoming

3.2.1. BIBLIOTECA OF LINE ANTI-CORRUPTION KNOWLEDGE CENTER

An Annotated Bibliography

Anti-Corruption Knowledge Center

Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella. 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Corruption: A Review of Empirical Contributions." *IDS Bulletin: Liberalization and the New Corruption* 27, 2 (April): 6-11.

This paper reviews the empirical literature on corruption to show how new data sets are contributing to robust studies and testing of hypotheses.

° _____. 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic." *The Economic Journal* 107 (July): 1023-1042.

The essay suggests that interventionist industrial policies to promote investment and research and development encourage corruption. Consequently, benefits from such investments are diminished by the corrupt practices. The authors caution that their sample is small and the conclusions, while robust, stem from a narrow data base.

° Alam, M.S. 1990. "Some Economic Costs of Corruption." *The Journal of Development Studies* 27, 1 (October): 89-97.

This article argues that bribery cannot improve a country's economic efficiency through the creation of auction-like conditions. It takes the position that the patrimonial character of the LDCs restricts access to bribery and reduces the possibilities of detection.

° _____. 1995. "A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications." *Kyklos* 48, (3): 419-435.

This essay asks why does corruption vary across government agencies in the same state, and sometimes,

even within the same agency. It notes that most of the literature takes the perspective of winners in an emphasis on inducements and pressures for entry into corrupt exchanges. The author advocates taking the perspective of the losers, the victims of corruption. Based on evidence from South Asia, the author concludes that corruption is a contest between two parties. Variation among and within governments depends on political, economic, legal, and cultural factors in a given country.

- _____. 1996. "Corruption and Countervailing Actions in Pakistan." Northeastern University, Department of Economics, Mimeo.

Corruption necessarily creates winners and losers. This paper examines corruption from the perspective of losers.

- Anderson, Gary and Peter J. Boettke. 1997. "Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State." *Public Choice* 93, 1-2 (October): 37-53.

This essay draws an analogy between the former Soviet Union's centrally-planned economy and the extractive policies of 17th century mercantilist states. Staff working on transition economies may find this article useful for understanding policies that informed the previous regime.

- Andvig, Jens Christopher. 1991. "The Economics of Corruption: A Survey." *Studi economici* 46 (4-3):

This literature review concentrates primarily on the literature in economics. The author divides the literature into themes of situational analysis, public contracts, queues, status of agents, institutional explanations, cultural differences or norm-based explanations, specific models of multiple equilibrium models of corruption, the welfare economics of corruption, and empirical investigations of corruption.

- Andvig, Jens Chr. And Karl Ove Moene. 1990. "How Corruption may Corrupt." *The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (13): 63-76.

This article presents an argument that the same socioeconomic structures can result in different levels of corruption. The authors develop a model showing that multiple equilibria may emerge in similar circumstances. It may be useful for task managers to understand variable levels of corruption in different countries.

- Bamrud, Joachim. 1996. "The Other Face of Business in Latin America." *Latin Trade* (September): 34-41.

Nice magazine article on the costs of corruption to trade. Points to the impact that privatization and deregulation has on reducing corruption. Concludes with a reprint of the Caracas Convention.

- Bardhan, Pranab. 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues." *Journal of Economic Literature* 35 (Sept): 1320-1346. Available at the Joint Library.

This article is a highly useful and excellent review of the literature on corruption. It divides the literature among five general issues: corruption and efficiency, corruption and growth, national differences in corruption, policy issues in reducing corruption, and incentives for reducing corruption. Task managers will find this article to be an excellent introduction into a large and highly varied literature on the subject.

- Bayart, Jean-François. 1997. "Le « capital social » de l'État malfaiteur, ou les ruses de l'intelligence politique," in *La criminalisation de l'État en Afrique*, 55-76. Edited by Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou. Paris: Édition Complexe.

This chapter presents a cultural-historic argument for the extent of corruption in African states.

° Bayart, Jean-François, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou. 1997. "De l'État kleptocrate à l'État malfaiteur?" in *La criminalisation de l'État en Afrique*, 17-54. Edited by Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou. Paris: Édition Complexe.

This chapter argues that corruption is a malaise that currently afflicts the African state. Governments in Africa have ceased to operate as political entities and become willing participants in a wide range of corrupt and criminal activities. The chapter proposes six indicators of a policy of *criminalisation* among African states: an extension of the private use of violence to office holders, a small coterie of people around the core of power that benefits from the extension of violence, the exploitation of official positions to engage in international commerce, the presence of international crime networks, a cultural image that condones criminal activities, and an increasing importance of criminal activities for a country's economy. Based primarily on evidence from Zaire (Congo), the essay concludes that Africa has become increasingly populated by criminal states.

° Becker, Gary S. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *The Journal of Political Economy* 76, 2 (March-April): 169-217.

This classic article analyzes the relationship between punishment and an individual's willingness to engage in an illegal act. It asks what is the optimal level of punishment to deter crime. The optimal level of punishment is largely a function of the cost of enforcement, investigation, and punishment. It concludes that the optimal levels of sanction depends upon the overall cost of enforcement.

° Bénin, République du. 1996. **Decret No. 96-579 du 19 décembre, Portant création, organisation, attributions et fonctionnement de la Cellule de la moralisation de la vie publique.**"

° Berkman, Steve. 1996. "The Impact of Corruption on Technical Cooperation Projects in Africa." *The International Journal of Technical Cooperation* 2, 2 (Winter): 67-82.

This article assesses the impact of corruption on the management of public institutions. The article provides a useful list of corrupt practices that a task manager might encounter in managing a project in Africa. It finishes with a set of proposed responses to corruption that will improve public sector management.

° Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities." *Journal of Political Economy* 90 (5): 988-1002.

This paper provides a taxonomy of DUP activities. These activities include the use of funds for lobbying for protection, market share, licenses, and monopolistic barriers to market. The basic characteristic is that DUP activities use funds to for rent-seeking and bribery with an aim of making a profit.

° Bialos, Jeffrey P. and Gregory Hussian. 1995. **The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Corruption in Russia and Other Transitional Economies.** Washington: Weil Gotshal and Manges.

This paper analyzes the impact of the FCPA on corruption in the Russia and transition economies. The conclusion is that the US government needs to take some special steps to improve the competitiveness of American firms in Russia and transition economies.

° Bigsten, Arne and Karl Ove Moene. 1997. "Growth and Rent Dissipation: the Case of Kenya." *Journal of African Economies* 5, 2 (June): 177-198.

Corruption in Kenya is closely linked to the government's lack of legitimacy. Ethnic competition and patron client relationships have undermined both political stability and policy-making. The government uses its resources to purchase support while increasing repression of its opponents. As a consequence, the public sector is overstaffed and corruption permeates its capacity to deliver services. Kenya has accordingly suffered an economic decline.

° **Blalock, Joyce. 1989. "The Importance of a Multidisciplinary Approach in Fighting Corruption." *The Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference Report*, 121-125. [Place of publication?].**

° **Bliss, Christopher and Rafael Di Tella. 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?" *Journal of Political Economy* 105, 51 (October): 1001-1023.**

This article is useful for staff who want to understand the relationship between corruption and competition. It offers an explanation of under what circumstances competition may limit the costs of corruption.

° **Botswana, Government of. 1994. Botswana Government Extraordinary Gazette "Corruption and Economic Crime Bill." Bill Number 8 (25 May).**

This law creates Benin's anti-corruption agency.

° **Braguinsky, Serguey. 1996. "Corruption and Schumpeterian Growth in Different Economic Environments." *Contemporary Economic Policy* 14 (July): 14-25.**

The article argues that corruption in a competitive environment is likely to enable economic growth. However, corruption in a totalitarian environment is economically inefficient and leads to stagnation.

° **Busch, Gary K. 1992. "Crime and Corruption: One View of a Parallel System." Mimeo, Transparency International.**

This paper looks at the internationalization of corruption and crime. It looks specifically at four fields: fraud in construction, maritime fraud, money laundering, and 'parlour-room crime' (fake antiquities, art, etc.). The paper might be useful for managers working in any of these fields.

° **Cadot, Olivier. 1987. "Corruption as a Gamble." *Journal of Public Economics* 33, 2 (July): 223-244.**

The essay presents a model of corruption using a game in which players include a government official, a license, and an individual submitting a request. The paper demonstrates that corruption may operate at multiple equilibria.

° **Caiden, Gerald E. 1993. "From the Specific to the General: Reflections on the Sudan." *Corruption and Reform* 7, (3): 205-213.**

This case study on Sudan argues that the Numayri Government fell because of its extraordinary levels of corruption. The argument has implications for considering opportunities of action in cases of government failures.

° **Campos, Jose Edgardo L. 1991. "The 'Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society' Revisited: Cronyism, Political Instability and Development." Paper prepared for presentation at the World Bank, September 27.**

This paper distinguishes between competitive rent-seeking and cronyism. It argues that cronyism leads to a capture of monopolies by a favored elite, which contributes to political instability. The paper is an excellent analysis of the political-economy of cronyism, an economically expensive form of rent-seeking found in many developing countries.

° **Cartier-Bresson, Jean. 1997. "Corruption Networks, Transaction Security and illegal Social Exchange." *Political Studies* (65): 463-476.**

This article argues that most studies of corruption concentrate on occasional and unorganized behavior. It analyzes instead networks of corrupt actors who interact in regular, organized corruption. The article concludes that the study of networks has more to offer for an understanding of corruption than the

classic political economy approach.

- _____. 1997. "The Economics of Corruption." In *Democracy and Corruption in Europe*, 148-165. Edited by Donatella Della Porta and Yves Mény. London: Pinter.

This article outlines a broad range of economic theories and shows how their precepts may enrich the study of corruption in democratic governments.

- Charlick, Robert B. 1993. "Corruption in Political Transition: A Governance Perspective." *Corruption and Reform* 7, (3): 177-187.

Corruption reflects deeper problems in effective governance. The author argues that the transitions in Africa provide a unique opportunity to bring about positive change in policy pluralism, political accountability, and information openness. Corruption is seen as a product of political competition and a drive among politicians to remain in office.

- Cheung, Steven N.S. 1996. "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption." *Contemporary Economic Policy* 14 (July): 1-5.

Focusing on transition economies, the article assumes that all government officials are self-maximizers who are receptive to opportunities for corruption. It notes that whereas competitive arrangements in the private sector limit venal behavior, monopolies in the public sector create incentives for corruption. The article concludes that introducing competition into transition economies will reduce opportunities for corruption.

- Choi, Myung Ju. 1991. "Rent-Seeking, Growth, and Distribution: An Alternative Approach." Mimeo. Oxford University, June.
- Chossudovsky, Michel. 1996. "Comment les mafias gangrènent l'économie mondiale." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Décembre): 24-25.

This essay discusses how organized crime that has accompanied the expansion of a global economy.

- Coolidge, Jacqueline and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 1997. "High-Level Rent-Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1780* (June).

This paper analyzes the negative impact that rent-seeking by high level government officials has on African economic growth. It distinguishes between benevolent autocrats and kleptocrats to determine which has a greater incentive to engage in corrupt practices. The authors note that a kleptocrat has a greater incentive to be corrupt because of the shorter time horizon. In conclusion, the Bank has an incentive to use caution in lending to governments with kleptocratic leaders.

- Crotty, John. 1997. "Measures to Address Corruption Problems in Tax and Customs Administrations." Paper prepared for presentation at the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima - Peru, September 7-11.

Provides the IMF's perspective on measures that might be undertaken to reduce corruption in tax and customs administration.

- Das Gupta, Arindam and Dilip Mookherjee. 1996. "Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering Devices." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 12, 2 (October): 408-431.

This article analyzes how tax amnesties increase government revenues and diminish the overall size of a country's informal sector earnings.

- ° **Defensor-Santiago, Miriam. 1989. "Corruption Prevention Strategies in Developing Countries." The Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference Report, 8-12. [Place of publication?].**

Keynote address by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Republic of the Philippines on the problems governments face to reduce corruption.

- ° **De Speville, Bertrand. 1997. "Combatting Corruption: Hong Kong's Battle and the ICAC." Paper prepared for the Latvia Workshop on Anti-Corruption, Riga, 12-13 February.**

This outline of a paper for a conference presentation describes the Hong Kong ICAC.

- ° **_____. 1997. *Hong Kong: Policy Initiatives Against Corruption*. Paris: OECD Development Centre.**

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. It begins with a discussion of the history behind the ICAC, its statutes, and effectiveness. Most importantly, the paper acknowledges the centrality of Hong Kong's multifaceted approach to combatting corruption: enforcement, education, prevention. The paper is useful for any manager advising a client government about the strengths of an anti-corruption agency.

- ° **_____. 1996. "The Experience of Hong Kong in Combating Corruption." In *Uganda International Conference on Good Governance in Africa: Empowering Civil Society in the Fight Against Corruption*, 159-166. Edited by Petter Langseth and Fiona Simpkins. Washington: The World Bank.**

The paper gives a description of the Hong Kong, Independent Commission Against Corruption.

- ° **Doig, Alan. 1995. "Good Government and Sustainable Anti-Corruption Strategies: A Role for Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies?" *Public Administration and Development* 15 (May): 151-165.**

The essay presents a discussion of government, good governance, and anti-corruption agencies drawn largely from a 1993 British Council report. Drawing largely on political science literature from the 1970s, the author advocates the expansion of anti-corruption agencies based on the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption.

- ° **Evans, Peter B. and James E. Rauch. 1995. "Bureaucratic Structures and Economic Performance in Less Developed Countries." IRIS Working Paper No. 175 (August).**

This study assesses the extent to which internal promotion and meritocratic recruitment improve the functioning of a bureaucracy. It concludes that a better performing public sector, with rational promotion and recruitment, has less corruption.

- ° **Finch, C. David. 1996. "Role of International Agencies in Fighting Corruption." Mimeo.**

This paper presents a critical assessment of the impact of international agencies in combating corruption.

- ° **Fung, Daniel. 1997. "Anti-Corruption and Human Rights Protection: Hong Kong's Jurisprudential Experience." Paper prepared for presentation at the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima - Peru, September 7-11.**

This paper provides a description of the statutes underlying Hong Kong's ICAC.

- ° **Galtung, Fredrik. 1997. "Frameworks for Sustainable Anti-Corruption Control." Mimeo. Cambridge University, May.**

The creation of a sustainable anti-corruption framework is a major challenge for developing countries.

This paper suggests a framework based on fostering an awareness of a country's economic and political institutions.

- ° **Geddes, Barbara and Artur Ribeiro Neto. 1992. "Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazil." *Third World Quarterly* 13 (4): 641-661.**

This article discusses the apparent increase of corruption that occurred in Brazil after its democratic transition under the Collor Administration. It identifies the paradoxical roots of corruption in changes in electoral rules and the constitution at a time when controls were being relaxed. Government officials were able to extract revenues for personal use because the rules over their actions were not enforced.

- ° **Gillespie, Kate and Gwenn Okruhlik. 1991. "The Political Dimensions of Corruption Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis." *Comparative Politics* (October): 77-95.**

This article provides a conceptual framework to analyze anti-corruption campaigns within governments and across states. It explores the political variables involved in anti-corruption campaigns and is useful for understanding the politics of reducing official venality.

- ° **Global Coalition for Africa. 1997. "Corruption: The Botswana Experience." Washington: Global Coalition for Africa.**

This paper chronicles Botswana's response to corruption leading to the passage of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act and Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime.

- ° **Glynn, Patrick, Stephen J. Kobrin, and Moisés Naím. 1997. "The Globalization of Corruption." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, 7-27. Edited by Kimberly Ann Elliot. Washington: The Institute for International Economics.**

This chapter argues that an international backlash against corruption has been manifest in the outcry among governments and international non-governmental organizations. The effort to extend the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act internationally is evidence of this globalization of intolerance.

- ° **Gorta, Angela and Suzie Forell. 1994. "Unraveling Corruption: A Public Sector Perspective: Surveys of NSW Public Sector Employees' Understanding of Corruption and their Willingness to Take Action." Sydney, Australia: Independent Commission Against Corruption (March).**

The report summarizes the work of the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia. Researchers conducted a survey on the question "you can't something corrupt if it is done for the right reasons. Agree or disagree?" The report publishes the results of responses to the survey question.

- ° **Gould, David J. and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes. 1983. "The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 580. Washington: The World Bank.**

This working paper argues that conditions in the developing world make corruption a strong problem. It notes that rapid socio-economic change, strong kinship and ethnic ties, and new institutions combined with political softness, widespread inequalities, and a state lacking legitimacy are conducive to corruption. Considering that corruption has a deleterious impact on development, the paper concludes that a political and public climate that favors impartiality and clean government is necessary for a reduction in corrupt behavior.

- ° **Harriss-White, Barbara and Gordon White. 1996. "Corruption, Liberalization, and Democracy." *IDS Bulletin: Liberalization and the New Corruption* 27, 2 (April): 1-6.**

This article analyzes the emergence of a new corruption of rapacious elites who engage in criminal behavior free from constraints of cold war patrons. It notes the challenge that such a change presents to combatting corruption.

° **Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, eds.. 1997 (Fourth edition). *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.**

This book is a compilation of 56 of the classic studies of corruption drawn from academic journals and books. It is particularly useful for its interdisciplinary approach.

° **Heimann, Fritz F. 1997. "Combatting International Corruption: The Role of the Business Community." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, 147-161. Edited by Kimberly Ann Elliott. Washington: Institute for International Economics.**

The author, a founding member of TI, focuses his chapter on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and its impact on international business. Corruption, according to the author, must be attacked from both the demand side -- officials who demand bribes -- as well as the supply side -- business people willing to pay bribery. Among the major organizations to combat corruption is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The chapter advocates extending the FCPA to other countries and thereby ending the tax subsidies that competing corporations enjoy.

° **International Monetary Fund. 1997. "IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues." *IMF Survey* (August 5): 233-234.**

This article lays out the governance guidelines for IMF staff.

° **_____. 1997. "World Bank Development Strategy Targets Corruption, Environment, and Institution-Building." *IMF Survey* (May 26): 162-163.**

An article that discusses the papers presented by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Michael Johnston at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997.

° **James, Wilmont. 1996. "Parliamentary Ethics and Government Corruption: Playing with Public Trust." *Public Opinion Service Reports* 3 (February).**

This paper presents survey results from South Africa on popular perceptions about corruption.

° **Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann, and Andrei Schleifer. 1997. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition." Paper prepared for presentation for the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington, September 4-5, 1997.**

The unofficial economy has played a critical role in the transition of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from socialism to capitalism. We provide a theory of the unofficial economy in transition. In this theory, unattractive combinations of taxes, regulations, and public goods supplied by the government can lead to the movement of economic activity to the unofficial sector and poor overall economic performance. The article shows that an understanding of the shift from official to unofficial economy is critical to understanding what has occurred in transition economies.

° **Johnston, Michael. 1997. "Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, 61-82. Edited by Kimberly Ann Elliot. Washington: The Institute for International Economics.**

This chapter argues forcefully that any assessment of corruption must take a country's political

dimensions into account. To make this argument, Johnston asserts that it is critical to understand who decides corrupt distributions about who gets what benefits from corruption. He concludes that to combat corruption an analysis of the distribution of benefits is necessary to formulate a feasible, multi-dimensional effort.

- _____ . ***Political Corruption and Public Policy in America. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.***

This book provides a number of useful definitions of corruption and explores how they relate to policy in the United States.

- _____ . ***1996. "The Search for Definitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption." International Social Science Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies 149 (September): 321-336.***

This article explores the multiple problems that confront efforts to define corruption in a meaningful fashion. It is useful for understanding the complexity of defining corrupt behavior.

- _____ . ***1997. "What Can Be Done About Entrenched Corruption?" Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, April 30 - May 1.***

Corruption is endogenous to a given country and is symptomatic of deeper conflicts. Entrenched political and bureaucratic corruption are in equilibria. The paper suggests that it is only possible to move from high to low corruption by encouraging competition and providing guarantees of civil liberties and economic rights.

- _____ . ***1993. "'Micro' and 'Macro' Possibilities for Reform." Corruption and Reform 7, (3): 189-204.***

This chapter argues that democratic transitions revitalize civil society, which in turn, imposes greater accountability on a government by demanding less corruption. It concludes that improved public sector management is essential if a government wishes to reduce corruption.

- ***Kattholo, T.M. 1996. "Crime in Southern Africa: Toward the 2000." Paper presented at a regional workshop, Grand Palm Hotel, Gaborone (19 June).***

This paper discusses the three-way strategies of the Botswana anti-corruption agency of education, investigation, and enforcement. It gives a highly optimistic assessment of progress against corruption in Botswana.

- ***Kaufmann, Daniel. 1996. "Listening to Stakeholders Spell the C..... Word: The 'Tackling-Corruption-is-Taboo' Myth meets some Evidence." Mimeo. Cambridge: Harvard Institute of International Development (September).***

Based on survey work, this paper advocates that the Bank emphasize reducing corruption in its approach to lending.

- _____ . ***1997. "Corruption: the Facts." Foreign Policy 107 (Summer): 114-131.***

This paper explains the costs of corruption to a government. The paper rejects arguments that corruption "greases" development, that reforms breed bribery, and the notion that corruption cannot be controlled. Having exposed the "myths" about corruption, the paper argues that reducing venal behavior requires the involvement of civil society and a mix of programs including liberalization, deregulation, and tax, budget, institutional, civil service, and legal reforms.

- ***Kaufmann, Daniel and Paul Siegelbaum. 1995. "Privatization and Corruption in Transition***

Economies." *Journal of International Affairs* 50, 2 (Winter): 419-458.

Privatization was effectively forced upon the transition economies after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

This paper presents an analysis of different privatization techniques and how those methods have affected the incidence of corruption. It concludes that despite the incidence of corruption that followed privatization, the policies were positive for the transition economies.

◦ **Khan, Mushtaq. 1996. "A Typology of Corrupt Practices in Developing Countries." *IDS Bulletin: Liberalization and the New Corruption* 27, 2 (April): 12-21.**

This article a behavioral definition of corruption. It then presents various typologies for corrupt behavior.

◦ **_____. N.d. "Corruption in South Asia: Patterns of Development and Change." Mimeo. University of London, SOAS.**

This paper argues that the capitalist classes in Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Thailand have seized the state and uses corruption to extract capital from the workers and peasants and maintain a hold on power.

◦ **Klitgaard, Robert. 1996. "Cleaning Up and Invigorating the Civil Service." Background Paper prepared for the Civil Service Reform Study. Mimeo. Washington: The World Bank (November).**

The development agenda is moving from policy-based reform to institutional reform. The paper asserts that a reform of incentives and information, implicit in civil service reform, will decrease the incidence of corruption in developing economies.

◦ **_____. 1988. *Controlling Corruption*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.**

This seminal book on the subject has shaped much of the thinking about corruption for students and practitioners since its publication. The book uses various case samples including the Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Among the lessons the book contributes to thinking about corruption is the notion that the costs of eliminating corruption are excessively high and an optimal level of control is possible. This book is a useful work for anyone wishing to understand the phenomenon of corruption and strategies to bring it under control.

◦ **_____. 1996. "Roles for International Organizations in the Fight Against Corruption." Paper presented at the XIIIth International Congress of the International Society of Social Defense, Lecce, Italy, November 28-30.**

The paper argues that international organizations may assist individual countries combat corruption by helping them draft changes in laws, share information and operational knowledge, and implement tactics to facilitate change.

◦ **_____. 1997. "'Unanticipated Consequences' in Anti-Poverty Programs." *World Development* 25, 12 (December): 1963-1972.**

This article examines unanticipated effects of anti-poverty programs conducted by multilateral donors. It asserts that the unexpected effects may include a variety of distortions, including increased corruption.

When an official acquires discretionary power over a good or service, corruption may result as a consequence of diminished accountability.

◦ **Kong, Tat Yan. 1996. "Corruption and its Institutional Foundations: The Experience of South Korea." *IDS Bulletin* 27 (2): 48-55.**

The South Korean economy has grown steadily despite fairly significant levels of political corruption.

This paper argues that this growth is a consequence of the institutional foundations of Korean growth. As in Japan, donations to political parties in exchange for business favors remains a major form of corruption in South Korea. This close relation between business and government is suggested, first, as a reason for corruption's resilience in South Korea; and second, as a predictor that corruption will continue despite Korea's move toward democracy and economic liberalization.

- ° **Kpundeh, Sahr John. 1997. "Corruption and the Fight Against It: The Case of Sierra Leone." *Fighting Corruption: A Model for Building National Integrity*. Edited by Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr Kpundeh. Washington: The World Bank, EDI Seminar Series.**

This paper is a case study of corruption in Sierra Leone and the negative impact of corruption on governance.

- ° _____. 1993. "Prospects in Contemporary Sierra Leone." *Corruption and Reform* 7, (3): 237-247

This article assesses the capacity of the Sierra Leonian government to reduce administrative corruption during a period of political liberalization. It highlights the impact of corruption on bringing about political economic reform. The article is useful for managers working in countries with a lot of corruption.

- ° **Krueger, Anne O. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." *The American Economic Review* 64, 3 (June): 291-303.**

This seminal article introduces the concept of rents that are present in government monopolies. Competitive rent-seeking is a factor in societies where governments control sectors of the economy. The articles analyzes the opportunities created through state-owned enterprises, quantitative restrictions, and tariffs that lead to rent-seeking.

- ° **Kurer, Oskar. 1993. "Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources." *Public Choice* 77, (2): 259-273.**

This article shows the errors of what Kurer calls the revisionist approach to corruption. The revisionist approach -- notably Leff, Nye, and others --argues that corruption enhances market efficiency. The author argues convincingly that the revisionist approach is misleading and that corruption carries high costs, especially for developing economies.

- ° **Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 1997. "Corruption in Comparative Perspective." Paper prepared for presentation at the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima - Peru, September 7-11.**

This paper aggregates the results of surveys for 102 countries to present a "poll of polls."

- ° _____. 1997. "An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade." *Mimeo, University of Göttingen, April.*

This paper argues there exists a relationship between the extent of corruption in an importing country and the exporting country that complement each other. The relationship obtains because of the propensity of the exporter to offer bribes.

- ° **Langseth, Petter, Rick Stapenhurst, and Jeremy Pope. 1997. *The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption*. EDI Working Paper 400/142, E1976. Washington: The World Bank.**

This working paper explains the national integrity system approach pioneered by the Bank's Economic Development Institute and Transparency International.

° **Langseth, Petter and Rick Stapenhurst. 1997. National Integrity System: Country Studies. EDI Working Paper 400/144, E1978. Washington: The World Bank.**

This working paper reports on the experiences with National Integrity Seminars in Tanzania and Uganda.

° **Larrain, Claudio Orrego. 1994. "Corrupcion y modernizacion del Estado." Mimeo. Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo (Agosto).**

This paper analyzes the cost of corruption to democratizing Latin American regimes.

° **Leak, Tan Ah. 1996. "The Experience of Singapore in Combatting Corruption." In Uganda International Conference on Good Governance in Africa: Empowering Civil Society in the Fight Against Corruption, 151-158. Edited by Petter Langseth and Fiona Simpkins. Washington: The World Bank.**

This paper, presented at an EDI conference in Uganda, describes Singapore's experience fighting corruption.

° **Lee, Pak K. 1997. "The Political Economy of State Enterprise Relations in China's Shaanxi Province." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 27 (3): 287-314.**

This article examines the relations of China's state-owned enterprises and the government in Shaanxi province. It analyzes the creation of rents and the incidence of local state intervention in the market. The article is useful for understanding the creation of rents in China's state-owned enterprise sector.

° **Leiken, Robert S. 1996-1997. "Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic." *Foreign Policy* 105 (Winter): 55-73**

A highly readable article. It argues that an explosion in the incidence of corruption has occurred worldwide. The reasons for this explosion are two: the Cold War's end led to higher disclosures of malfeasance and the spread of democracy.

° **Leung, C.M. 1989. "The Effect of Corruption on Economic Growth." *The Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference Report*, 147-148. [Place of publication?].**

This presentation describes corruption as a costly activity for any economy. It uses a discussion of the costs of corruption to highlight the important progress that Hong Kong has made in controlling venality in its public sector.

° **Lewis, Peter. 1996. "From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, (1): 79-103.**

This essay traces the process of decline and then collapse of Nigeria's public sector under after the 1984 coup. It shows how the disintegration of public sector management led to the emergence of a predatory state, the leaders of which extract resources for their personal gain.

° **Leys, Colin. 1965. "What is the Problem About Corruption?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 3, (2): 215-230.**

Among the earliest statements on corruption as an efficiency-enhancing market behavior. The essay concludes that corruption is a positive developmental force by creating competition and market structures for private sector actors.

° **Little, Walter. 1996. "Corruption and Democracy in Latin America." *IDS Bulletin* 27 (2): 64-70.**

Reform movements in Latin America have increased considerably over the last decade. Dismissals of ministers in Mexico, judges in Venezuela, and two presidents have been forced from office. This essay analyzes how these events occurred. It concludes that the events resulted from a mix of policies that enabled reforms throughout Latin America.

° **Lodge, Tom. 1998. "Political Corruption in South Africa." *African Affairs* 97 (387): 157-187.**

This article disputes the public perception that the South African bureaucracy is largely corrupt. It finds that contrary to public opinion, corruption is more prevalent in the regional governments than the central administration. The article concludes that the extent of corruption in regional governments is a consequence of corrupt homeland civil services.

° **Lui, Francis T. 1996. "Three Aspects of Corruption." *Contemporary Economic Policy* 14 (July): 26-29.**

This article argues that corruption entails three aspects: first, it is rent-seeking that deviates from a competitive market; second, it is illegal; and **third, corruption is a perversion of political power.**

° **Mallik, S.P. 1989. "An Anti-Corruption Strategy." *The Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference Report*, 119-120. [Place of publication?].**

An address by the executive director (Vigilance), Engineers India Limited on the impact of the Central Bureau of Investigation that came out of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.

° **Manion, Melanie. 1996. "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing." *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 12, 1 (April): 167-195.**

This article employs game theory to examine the payment of bribes to officials. It demonstrates how the information asymmetries lead to an official's ability to demand payment for services that are part of their positions. The article concludes that to move away from an equilibrium in which corruption is common requires substantial institutional changes. The utility of this piece is that it provides a rigorous analysis of information availability and corruption.

° **Mauro, Paolo. 1995. "Corruption and Growth." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, 2 (August): 681-711.**

This important article analyzes a data set, obtained from Business International, that shows that corruption, red tape, an inefficient judiciary and political instability lower investment and economic growth. It shows that a one-standard deviation improvement in bureaucratic efficiency contributed to an increase in investments. The article argues forcefully that reducing corruption and bureaucratic impediments has a direct impact on investment and economic growth.

° **_____. 1997. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, 83-107. Edited by Kimberly Ann Elliot. Washington: The Institute for International Economics.**

This article identifies a number of causes and consequences of corruption through cross-country analysis. It presents new results of the impact of corruption that uses a larger data set than the author's previous *QJE* article. Results indicate that corruption lowers a overall investment and economic growth by altering the composition of government expenditures.

° **_____. 1997. "Why Worry About Corruption?" *Economic Issues* 6. Washington: IMF.**

This paper lists various causes of corruption including trade restrictions, subsidies, price controls, low

civil service salaries, natural resource endowments, and sociological factors. The consequences include lower investment rates, loss of tax revenues, poor aid flows, and distortions in government expenditure and capacity to deliver services. It concludes that corruption negatively affects investment and growth.

- ° **Médard, J.-F. 1986. "Public Corruption in Africa: A Comparative Perspective." *Corruption and Reform* (1): 115-131.**

The author sees corruption as a defining characteristic of African governments. He defines corruption as the misuse of public office for personal gain. This definition then shapes an analysis of bribery and embezzlement that contribute to what the author calls a neo-patrimonial state. This article may interest task managers working in African countries in which corruption is systemic.

- ° **Mény, Yves. 1997. "'Fin de Siècle' Corruption: Change, Crisis and Shifting Values." *International Social Science Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies* 149 (September): 309-320.**

Shifting values have elevated corruption as a critical problem for government. Perceptions of the costs of corruption hold that it has increased and an urgency has become apparent to control its incidence. Corruption reflects a crisis in the efficient functioning of the public sector and has become a priority for governments to control. Task managers and staff may find this a useful article to think about corruption conceptually and how it affects public sector efficiency.

- ° **Moody-Stuart, George. 1992. "Grand Corruption in Third World Development." Paper prepared for "Transparency International" Meeting, Latimer House 24-25 July.**

This paper lays out an analysis of the costs of corruption and suggests some practical remedies.

- ° **Mookherjee, Dilip and I.P.L. Png. 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?" *The Economic Journal* 105 (January): 145-156.**

This essay builds on the premise that any delegation of authority creates opportunities for corruption. Concentrating on individuals who are responsible for the enforcement of regulations, the authors explore the relationship between sanction and opportunity. The conclusion is that only large increases in penalty will effectively diminish corruption.

- ° **Moore, Mick. 1998. "Death Without Taxes" Paper presented at the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Public Sector Seminar Series (March 13).**

This paper discusses the extent to which governments of the world's poorest countries are becoming financially dependent on aid. Many obtain over half of their revenues from aid. These levels of aid undermine creating accountable governments.

- ° **Moore, Mick and John Toye. 1997. "Corruption and Taxation." Mimeo, June.**

This paper situates corruption in larger processes of taxation. It notes that in a democracy, taxation needs to be essentially invisible, or at least as equitable as possible. Reducing corruption therefore benefits tax collection and the legitimacy of the state.

- ° **Morice, Alain. 1995. "Corruption, loi et société: Quelques propositions." *Revue tiers monde* 36, 141 (March): 41-65.**

This article takes an anthropological approach to analyze corruption as widely encompassing social phenomenon. It advocates a socio-anthropological approach to corruption and thereby provides a useful, non-economic perspective on the phenomenon.

- ° **Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1993. "Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly to**

Growth." *The American Economic Review* 83, 2 (May): 409-414.

This article argues that rent-seeking is harmful to growth for two reasons. First, rent-seeking tends naturally to have increasing returns. The effect is that high levels of rent-seeking are self-sustaining. Second, public rent-seeking is particularly harmful to innovation. The authors assert that innovation is a key element in economic growth and rent-seeking is therefore costly to growth.

° **Nasaba, Alfred P.W. 1996. "Anti-Corruption Legislation in Uganda and its Improvement." In *Integrity Workshop in Uganda II: Final Workshop Proceedings*, 64-86. Edited by Petter Langseth and Fiona Simpkins. Washington: The World Bank.**

This paper describes the anti-corruption legislation in Uganda.

° **Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 1996. "L'économie morale de la corruption en Afrique." *Politique africaine* 63 (Octobre): 97-118.**

This article posits that corruption in Africa results from a cultural impulse to assist family members and build a moral economy.

° **Olowu, Dele. 1993. "Roots and Remedies of Governmental Corruption in Africa." *Corruption and Reform* 7 (3): 227-236.**

The article argues that the causes of corruption in Africa may be attributed to the over-centralization of the state. A resulting pauperization of the public sector has resulted in endemic corruption. The chapter is useful for considering the political causes of corruption.

° **Olson, Mancur Jr. 1996. "Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Countries are Rich and Others Poor." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10, 2 (Spring): 3-24.**

This essay argues that economic performance is determined by the structure of incentives in a given society. It notes that national boundaries have a direct impact on different structures of incentives. The paper concludes that incentives vary from location to location and that collective action is oftentimes quite dissimilar from individual rationality.

° **_____. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *The American Political Science Review* 87, 3 (September): 567-576.**

This essay examines the incentives of autocrats to extract as much revenue from their countries as possible within limits imposed by optimal taxation rates. A dictatorship may extract less from an economy than roving bandits because of his longer time horizon. The shorter the time horizon for a leader in office, the greater the incentive to plunder an economy. Implications of this argument are that dictatorships are economically inefficient over longer periods of time.

° **_____. 1996. "Why Poor Economic Policies Must Promote Corruption." *Rivista di Politica Economica* 111, 3 (March): 9-51.**

Olson argues that corruption may be understood best by looking at economic institutions and policy. Corruption is a response to legislation and regulations that are 'market contrary'. Evidence from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union support an argument that market contrary policies contributed to a extensive corruption.

° **Parfitt, Trevor W. "Corruption, Adjustment and the African Debt." *Corruption and Reform* 6 (2): 25-44.**

This article refutes the argument that endemic corruption is responsible for the African debt crisis. Argues that democratic reforms are necessary to effect change in the incidence in corruption.

° **Pieth, Mark. 1997. "Contribution of Industrialised Countries in the Prevention of Corruption: The Example of the OECD." Paper prepared for presentation at the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima - Peru, September 7-11.**

This paper outlines the OECD anti-bribery initiative, particularly tax deductions for bribes.

° **Posner, Richard A. 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation. *Journal of Political Economy* 83 (4): 807-827.**

This article argues that competition to attain a monopoly transforms monopoly profits into social costs. Costs associated with regulation may exceed the social costs of monopoly. This is an argument that supports notions of corruption as enhancing competition.

° **Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, 3 (Summer): 51-69.**

This article disputes the notion that democracies necessarily protect property rights. It is an example of a larger debate on the relationship between democratic governments and economic growth. It concludes that politics underlie the capacity of a government to enact reforms and contribute to economic growth.

° **Quah, John S.T. 1997. "Singapore's Experience in Curbing Corruption." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, 841-853. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. Le Vine. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, fourth edition.**

This paper analyzes the anti-corruption campaign in Singapore. It chronicles the passage of the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. The author argues that Singapore has succeeded in reducing corruption because of the commitment of its political leadership, its comprehensive anti-corruption legislation, and the establishment of an incorrupt anti-corruption agency that investigates and enforces violations of the POCA.

° **Riley, Stephen P. 1993. "Post-Independence Anti-Corruption Strategies and Contemporary Effects of Democratization." *Corruption and Reform* 7 (3): 249-261.**

This article attacks the corruption as a consequence of African culture argument. Variations of this viewpoint are found in defense of gift-giving, reciprocity, or patron-client relations. The author rejects these arguments and focuses on political leadership as the primary force behind corruption. This article is useful for thinking about the political factors underlying corruption in Africa.

° **Root, Hilton. 1996. "Corruption in China: Has it Become Systemic?" *Asian Survey* 36 (August): 741-757.**

This article explores how *guanxi* relationships respond to information asymmetries and create incentives for venal commercial deals. It is useful for understanding the role of informal networks and corruption in China.

° **Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1997. "Corruption and Development." Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, April 30 - May 1.**

Corruption occurs throughout the world but is of special concern in poor countries. Widespread corruption is a symptom that the state is functioning poorly, and ineffective states can retard and misdirect economic growth. The economic costs and causes of corruption are reflected in the empirical evidence and the theoretical literature. It is useful to distinguish between corruption that is concentrated at the top and centralized corruption involving many payers and recipients. The policy options are

explored for developing countries with leaders who are committed to reform. Structural reform is often necessary in such areas as tax and customs collection, regulation of private business, and development of state-sponsored infrastructure projects. Furthermore, basic government reform is often required to increase the transparency and accountability of the public sector and to facilitate the organization of independent oversight groups. Most developing countries must also face the difficult task of civil service reform and improvement of enforcement capabilities. The World Bank can assist in such anticorruption efforts as part of its growing interest in the creation of institutional structures favorable to shared growth.

- _____. 1996. "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption." *International Social Science Journal: Corruption in Western Democracies* 149 (September): 365-380.

This article argues that corruption scandals are a sign that a people differentiate between the public and private realms of finance. Whereas in a democracy, the consumption of public revenues constitutes a corruption scandal, such a distinction is impossible in an autocracy in which the ruler has ownership over the state. The article concludes that democracy may limit corruption as politicians may fear losing office as a consequence of involvement in scandals.

- _____. 1996. "Corruption in Pakistan: Causes and Cures." Paper prepared for the Pakistan 2000 Report. May.

This paper analyzes the causes of corruption in Pakistan. Its evidence is drawn from survey work that demonstrates the extent of private sector corruption is quite high in Pakistan. As a consequence, business in Pakistan is expensive and the government is not perceived as being legitimate. The paper concludes that although corruption cannot be eliminated in Pakistan, its incidence may be reduced enough to enable the economy to grow.

- _____. 1997. "The Political Economy of Corruption." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, 31-60. Edited by Kimberly Ann Elliot. Washington: The Institute for International Economics.

Corruption is a dysfunctional outcome of the interaction between the public and private. It is a behavior that often reflects the size of the state. Although corruption cannot feasibly be eliminated because that would be too expensive, it is possible to limit its extent and impact.

- _____. 1996. "The Political Economy of Corruption - Causes and Consequences." *Viewpoint* 74 (April).

This paper states that corruption occurs at the interface of the public and private sectors. It notes that bribes are paid to get government benefits or avoid costs. A resulting lack of efficiency imposes general costs. The article concludes that corruption is an impediment to growth and long-term economic performance.

- _____. 1995. "The Political Economy of Corruption." Notes for World Bank Seminar. October 18.

This paper includes notes prepared for a presentation at a Bank conference in 1985.

- _____. 1996. "Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption: Transparency, Competition, and Privatization." *Viewpoint* 75 (April).

The level of corruption is often a function of the overall level of public benefits, the risk to officials who engage in venal behavior, and the relative power of the two parties in a corrupt transaction. Civil service reforms, increased transparency, and the creation of an ombudsman or other anti-corruption agency assembled in an integrated approach are the most effective way to reduce corruption.

- _____. 1996. "When is Corruption Harmful?" Background paper for the World Bank's 1997 World

Development Report, *The State in a Changing World*. Washington: The World Bank (August).

An excellent literature review of the major issues on corruption.

- _____, 1995. "The Political Economy of Corruption." Notes for World Bank Seminar. October 18.
- _____, 1978. *The Political Economy of Corruption*. New York: Academic Press.

This is a seminal book on the political economy of corruption. Presents the idea that corruption exists at the interface of public and private sectors. The central argument is that corruption cannot be entirely eliminated, the cost of doing so would be excessively high. However, corruption may be reduced to a level that controls its costs and does not harm an economy. It is a statement that has influenced a significant number of subsequent studies on corruption and is therefore critical for anyone who wishes to understand the subject in any depth.

- **Rose Ackerman, Susan and Andrew H. W. Stone. 1996. "The Costs of Corruption for Private Business: Evidence from World Bank Surveys." Mimeo. Washington: The World Bank, (July).**

One way to discover how corruption affects private business is to survey managers concerning their relations with government. The authors summarize the results of two particularly useful surveys of private enterprise in Ukraine and Pakistan. They find that first, despite some differences in patterns between countries, the smallest firms pay proportionally more in bribes than larger firms, implying that bribery may be both a barrier to entry and a drag on growth of micro- and small enterprise. Second, bribes buy relief from a few basic things: most commonly, relief from potential tax or customs obligations, relief from the burden of complying with regulatory or administrative procedures and relief from uncertainty arising either from changing and unclear rules or from arbitrary, discretionary behavior by bureaucrats. However, the relationship of bribes to the burden of taxes and regulation is starkly different between countries, suggesting that bribes buy different things in different places. In Pakistan, bribery is associated with a lesser perceived burden of taxes, while in Ukraine, the level of bribes and the burden of taxes are positively related. Third, bribes are higher in the commercial sector than in industry or services. This suggests two things -- first, that extraction of rents or the complicitous sharing of the benefits of illegal behavior is easier or more attractive in trade, and second, that like any "tax", a disproportionate burden on one type of activity will distort investment decisions (unless it is matched or exceeded by disproportionate benefits). Fourth, the variability of repo

- **Ruzindana, Alex. 1997a. "Building a National Integrity System in Uganda." In *Good Governance for Sustainable Development; Final workshop Proceedings 13-14 March 1997, 1-5*. Edited by Sahr J. Kpundeh and Petter Langseth. Washington: The World Bank.**

This essay, written by the Inspector-General of Government responsible for anti-corruption in Uganda, argues that the key to an effective agency is strong leadership, political stability, and peace. It notes that the Ugandan IGG has employed a multi-faceted approach to combat corruption of education, prevention, and investigation and prosecution. The paper concludes that in the future, anti-corruption activities will move forward as a result of strong political leadership.

- _____, 1997b. "The Importance of Leadership in Fighting Corruption in Uganda." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, 133-145. Edited by Kimberly Ann Elliott. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- **Schleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishney. 1993. "Corruption." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 58, 3 (August): 599-617.**

The article focuses on the consequences of corruption for resource allocation. It argues that political structures and processes determine the extent of corruption in a given country. Unlike its sibling taxation, corruption is costly and therefore detrimental to a country's economic development. The paper draws important considerations of corruption as an activity that occurs under conditions of secrecy.

- ° _____ . 1992. "Pervasive Shortages Under Socialism." *RAND Journal of Economics* 23, 2 (Summer): 237-246.

This article presents a useful analysis of centrally-planned economies where bureaucrats plan shortages to create opportunities for bribes. Bureaucrat's incentives are to produce less, cause shortages, and demand bribes for under-produced goods. Underpricing and shortages create rents that managers consume. The implication is that bureaucrats and managers erect barriers through regulations and shortages that create opportunities for corruption.

- ° Sherman, Tom. 1995. "Combating Money Laundering in the Asia Pacific Region." *Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific Business Briefing*, 27 September.

This paper discusses the increase in money laundering activities internationally with an emphasis on East Asia.

- ° Standing Committee on International Legal Practice. 1996. "Report: Survey of Law on Bribery of Public Officials." Mimeo.

- ° _____ . 1996. Resolution of the Council on the International Bar Association." Mimeo.

- ° Svenson, Jakob. 1997. Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking." Mimeo. Washington: The World Bank (March).

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of public choice to show the relationship between widespread levels of corruption and rent-seeking.

- ° Tanzania, The United Republic of. 1996. Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, Report on the Commission on Corruption, Volumes 1 and 2. Dar es Salaam: November.

These two volumes, also known as the Warioba Report, describe the extent of corruption in Tanzania before 1996.

- ° Tanzi, Vito. 1995. "Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets." *Finance and Development* (December): 24-26.

An argument that special measures must be taken for situations where existing moral and social codes require that one help family and friends. Civil servants will then be expected to help their relations at significant cost to the government. Recommends a forced, periodic reassignment of civil servants **to prevent favoritism to family members and friends.**

- ° _____ . 1996. "Money Laundering and the International Financial System." IMF Working Paper WP/96/55 (May).

This paper examines money laundering from a macroeconomic and international perspective to argue that such actions have an impact on the international allocation of resources and the stability of international financial markets. It has implications for work on the globalization of financial markets and the world economy.

- ° Tirole, Jean. 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)." *The Review of Economic Studies* (63): 1-22.

The paper posits that collective reputations are composites of individual reputations and may be modeled as such. Four assumptions underlie the essay: a) the reputations of a group's members determine collective reputations; b) collective reputations build on imperfect past observations; c) past practices structure current behavior; d) new members mimic a group's elders. The paper concludes that

individual reputation stems from collective reputations that are based on past behaviors.

- _____. 1992. **"Persistence of Corruption." Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper 152 (October).**

Tirole argues that corruption persists over time as a consequence of historical patterns. He avoids the tautology that corruption persists because it was historically present by arguing that corruption ratchets up or down according to opportunities for collusion between bribers and bribe-takers.

- **Torres, Craig, Loel Millman, and Diane Solis. 1996. "Raul's World: Cash, Connections - and Corruption?" *The Wall Street Journal*, August 7.**

A *WSJ* story that chronicles the probe into the Raul Salinas and corruption in Mexico.

- **Tullock, Gordon. 1996. "Corruption Theory and Practice." *Contemporary Economic Policy* 14 (July): 6-13.**

This article presents an article that circumstances in which civil servants do not receive salaries and therefore offer a fee-for-service arrangement, an economically efficient outcome may result.

- **United Nations Development Programme. 1997. *Corruption and Good Governance. Discussion Paper 3. Management Development and Governance Division. New York: UNDP, July.***

This study begins from an assumption that corruption is a symptom of something wrong in the management of the state. It presents options to combat corruption. When corruption is endemic, the study argues that piecemeal reforms are probably ineffective. It argues that a multifaceted approach, including the cooperation of the donor community, is essential for an effective anti-corruption program.

- **Van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder. 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?" *IMF Working Paper WP/97/73.***

This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries.

- **Vincke, François. 1997. "The Business Community's Attitude towards Corruption. Special Focus on Private-to-Private Corruption." Paper prepared for presentation at the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima - Peru, September 7-11.**

This paper provides an analysis of private to private corruption in OECD countries.

- **Wade, Robert. 1984. "Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Populist Anarchy: An Indian Case." *Journal of Development Economics* 14 (3): 285-303.**

This essay addresses the persistence of corruption in irrigation administrations in India. Often repeated patterns of behavior allow an effective resistance to reform efforts. The highly-political nature of corruption is demonstrated by the politics of personnel transfers out of a region of those who oppose corruption and the transfer in of sympathetic and venal replacements. The conclusion is that policy reform in how resources are allocated is the best means to decrease corruption.

- _____. 1982. **"The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India." *Journal of Development Studies* 18 (3): 287-328.**

Irrigation engineers are able to illicit significant revenues by controlling the distribution of water to users.

Corruption is facilitated by personnel transfers for civil servants who work as engineers in irrigation projects. This process is a functional part of Indian politics.

- **Wallace, J. Clifford. 1998. "Resolving Judicial Corruption while Preserving Judicial Independence: Comparative Perspectives." *California Western International Law Journal* 28, 2 (Spring): 341-351.**

This paper analyzes the issues around combating corruption in the judiciary using evidence from Asia and the United States. It addresses specifically the tension implicit in the requirement that a judiciary be at once independent and accountable. The essay concludes that while accountability is crucial, judicial oversight must remain in the judiciary to avoid political investigations and removal of judges.

- **Waterbury, John. 1976. "Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco." *Government and Opposition* 11, 4 (Autumn): 426-443.**

The article posits that corruption may contribute to economic, social, and political stability according to whether it is endemic, planned, or developmental. It might be useful for managers working in countries with extremely high levels of corruption.

- **Wedeman, Andrew. 1997. "Looters, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend-Collectors: The Political Economy of Corruption in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 31, 4 (Summer): 457-478.**

This article tries to explain different patterns of corruption, that the author identifies as looting, scraping, and rent-collection, and development. The article is useful for thinking about the types of corruption that might be encountered in different circumstances.

- **Weinberg, Mark. 1989. "Prevention versus Prosecution in Dealing with Corruption." *The Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference Report*, 110-114. [Place of publication?].**

Address by the OC Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Australia.

- **Werlin, Herbert H. 1996. "Treating Political Illness: Using a Proactive Approach." Paper submitted to the World Bank World Development Report. Mimeo.**

The paper argues that improving governance is critical to reducing corruption.

- **Wignjowijoto, Hartojo. 1996. "Floods and Corruption." Mimeo. Asian Pacific Economic Consultancy Indonesia. February 11.**

This paper argues that corruption has contributed to inefficient land use planning by the government of Indonesia with a result that floods have grown more and more common for at risk areas.

4. EVENTOS INTERNACIONALES

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Cristina Steen-Sundberg	International Institute of Higher Studies on Criminal Sciences	Chief Prosecutor, Stockholm, Sweden
Giuliano Vassalli	International Institute of Higher Studies on Criminal Sciences	Judge, Italian Constitutional Court; Former Ministry of Justice; Professor Emeritus of Criminal Law, Rome, Italy; Vice President IAPL
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